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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Very  small  businesses,  otherwise  known  as  “microenterprises,”  play vital roles in the local, 
state, and national economies. As engines of employment, entrepreneurship, and innovation, 
microenterprises can be highly successful vehicles for inclusive and robust economic growth. 
However, many such businesses are constrained by lack of access to credit.  Microenterprise 
owners and entrepreneurs may lack the credit or operating history needed to obtain a 
traditional small business loan at a commercially viable rate of interest, or the loan amount 
requested may be too small for a traditional lender to consider. Undoubtedly, a great many 
entrepreneurial opportunities are lost for lack of viable financing. 
 
To address this problem, many state governments have established programs to help fund 
microenterprise,  often  through  private  “microlending” organizations that borrow from the 
state at subsidized rates and then relend those funds to microenterprises. Similar to a bank that 
takes in deposits and subsequently uses the funds to make loans, these programs supply 
funding to microlenders who can then put it to great use by leveraging their expertise in 
working with microenterprises. Because several other states have adopted various programs 
along these lines, Arkansas can look beyond its borders for policy options in designing its own 
microlender funding program. 
 
This brief recommends the creation of a state-supported microlending funding mechanism and 
the adoption of several provisions related to that mechanism: 
 
 Eligibility criteria for microlender participation in the state program to promote efficient 
allocation of funding, including non-profit status, a reasonable prospect of success, and 
a focus on target populations 
 Eligibility criteria, including size limits and evidence of credit constraints, to ensure only 
true microenterprises are borrowing from microlenders  
 Loan principal limits and relending requirements to promote maximum impact of state 
funds 
 A system of incentives for microlenders to promote best practices 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This brief recommends the creation of a state funding mechanism to support microfinance and 
describe some of the policy options available to the state to structure such a mechanism in a 
way that ensures its sustainability and integrity. The options laid out below have been taken 
from a survey of similar microlending programs established or proposed in several states, 
including Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. In 
the interest of brevity, the major design variables are discussed at a high level of generality, and 
some smaller issues are not discussed. Nonetheless, we hope that this brief can serve as a 
sound starting point for the design and drafting of legislation to expand access to microlending 
in Arkansas.  
 
Before continuing, it bears mentioning that this report is a student research project that was 
conducted under faculty supervision. No attorneys from the states at issue were involved in the 
research or writing of this report. Consequently, it constitutes neither legal advice nor the 
opinion of legal experts. 
 
II. THE ROLE OF MICROENTERPRISE IN THE ARKANSAS ECONOMY 
 
Microenterprises, typically defined as businesses with 10 or fewer employees, represent a 
critical component of the national economy, representing nearly nine out of ten businesses in 
the United States.1 The role of microenterprises in Arkansas is just as pronounced, representing 
approximately 88% of all businesses in the state.2 As robust engines of economic growth and 
development, as well as important sources of employment for millions of workers in Arkansas, 
microenterprises represent an important stabilizing force in the economy. Entrepreneurs and 
microenterprise owners are a vital force for creativity and production in a diverse set of sectors 
ranging from agribusiness to retail to service providers. 
 
Why Microfinance? 
Despite their central role in economic growth, microenterprises and entrepreneurs are often 
faced with a number of significant barriers when seeking to access tools and resources needed 
to fund operations and fuel continued growth. Among these barriers, one of the most 
significant is a lack of access to credit and lending facilities, which puts microenterprises and 
entrepreneurs at a significant competitive disadvantage in the marketplace, particularly when 
compared with larger businesses. While businesses of all sizes require access to credit to fund 
ongoing operations, finance expansion, and provide a buffer against unexpected events, access 
to credit is of particular importance to microenterprise owners during the start-up phase of 
operations. 
                                                     
1 Ass’n for Enter. Opportunity, Arkansas Microbusiness Sate Fact Sheet (2012), available at 
http://www.aeoworks.org/pdf/states/Microbusiness_State_Factsheet-AR.pdf. 
2 Id.  
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While the formal banking sector does offer loans to small businesses, and existing government-
sponsored programs such as the Small Business Administration (SBA) seek to increase the 
availability of credit, many microenterprises and entrepreneurs are nonetheless unable to 
obtain traditional bank or SBA loans. Indeed, an estimated 10 million microenterprises in the 
United States report insufficient access to the loans they need to start and grow. 
 
What factors explain this disconnect? Microenterprise owners and entrepreneurs may lack the 
credit or operating history needed to obtain a traditional small business loan at a commercially 
viable rate of interest, or the loan amount requested may be too small for a traditional lender 
to consider.  
 
The barriers to access to credit faced by microenterprise owners and entrepreneurs are further 
exacerbated during periods of low liquidity in the lending market, such as the current economic 
downturn. For microenterprise owners unable to tap formal lending opportunities, these 
periods of tight credit conditions often require making a difficult decision to tap into household 
savings or personal family networks for the necessary capital.  
 
Microfinance can fill an important gap by connecting microenterprise owners and 
entrepreneurs with access to credit. By providing small loans, typically lower than the average 
size provided through traditional lending institutions, and utilizing collateral conditions 
customized to meet the unique cash-flow needs of microenterprise owners in the start-up 
phase of operations, microfinance allows microenterprise owners to develop their businesses 
and operations in a commercially viable manner. Along with the immediate provision of credit 
provided by microfinance loans, microfinance borrowers also have the opportunity to build 
their credit history, which is often very helpful if and when microfinance borrowers seek to tap 
traditional lending sources later on in the lifecycle of their enterprises. 
 
III. THE NEED FOR A MICROLENDER FUNDING MECHANISM 
 
Microlenders generally use funding for purposes beyond simply providing capital to businesses. 
Microlenders often provide a variety services to their borrowers, including business training, 
business education, technology consulting, and a variety of other services. These services 
benefit communities, microlenders, and entrepreneurs alike by reducing the risk of default on 
loans and increasing the likelihood that enterprises will survive. 
 
Unfortunately, many microfinance institutions struggle to find a constant flow of funding. Loans 
made by microlenders are typically for small amounts and made to relatively high-risk 
borrowers; traditional banks generally will not offer such loans. In microfinance, margins are 
often relatively low and portfolio risk relatively high as compared to those of traditional 
financial institutions. Individual microlenders, unless they are large and well established, might 
find it difficult to securitize their loans, even if a secondary market for such securities existed. 
As a result, microfinance institutions cannot always access funding sources designed for 
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traditional financial institutions while still charging reasonable interest rates and remaining 
financially viable.  
 
A state funding mechanism would help fill a microlender’s otherwise unmet need for funding 
and ensure access to affordable credit for viable microenterprises. We recommend, however, 
that any such mechanism include qualify criteria that limits funding only to microlenders that 
adhere to well thought out best practices and microenterprises that truly lack access to other 
sources of funding. In the sections to follow, we will describe initiatives put in place in other 
states in an effort to provide examples of potential approaches and their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
IV. ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
To ensure that a microfinance funding mechanism can limit access to true microenterprises, 
well-crafted criteria must be utilized to determine which lenders may receive loans from the 
state and which small businesses may in turn borrow from those lenders. Because of its 
importance, this brief treats this topic in more detail than other aspects of program design. 
 
“Microfinance  Institution”  and  “Microenterprise”  Definitions as Screening 
Mechanisms 
There are two major concerns with intermediated, state-funded programs: First, there is the 
concern that that non-microfinance institutions or sham microfinance operations may attempt 
to access funding intended for legitimate microlenders. For example, non-microfinance 
institutions may attempt to supplement their profits by strategically accessing low-interest 
state funding and re-lending at higher rates. The second concern is that businesses that have 
access to traditional lending may attempt to take advantage of microloans. Under such a 
scenario, a business may attempt to replace the lending to which it has access via a traditional 
lender with more favorable loans from a microlender. As microfinance institutions typically take 
on loans with relatively high risk of default, they may be tempted to divert funding that would 
otherwise go to microenterprises to relatively low-risk traditional businesses. Clearly, there is 
compelling need for the state to subsidize lending to businesses that cannot easily access the 
mainstream financial system. 
 
Multiple states have implemented funding programs that lend only to strictly defined 
microfinance institutions and, via those legitimate microlenders, only to true microenterprises. 
Statutory definitions with clear eligibility requirements have thus played important roles in 
screening applicants at both levels. 
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Examples of State Eligibility Criteria  
(i) Montana MicroBusiness Development Act 
Montana’s  MicroBusiness  Development  Act  defines  a  Microbusiness  Development  Corporation  
(“MBDC”),  a  type  of  microfinance  institution,  as  “a nonprofit corporation organized and existing 
under the laws of the state to provide training, technical assistance, and access to capital for 
the  startup  or  expansion  of  qualified  microbusinesses.”3 Under the Act, a microbusiness is 
defined as a business enterprise located in Montana that:4 
(a) produces goods or provides services and has fewer than 10 full-time equivalent 
employees and annual gross revenue of less than $1 million; or 
(b) produces energy using an alternative renewable energy source  
The Montana Department of Commerce is responsible for certifying MBDCs. To become 
certified, a potential MBDC must present a plan including:5 
 its ability to administer loans, 
 a staffing plan,  
 evidence of community support,  
 evidence of sufficient operating income, 
 and evidence of business clients as potential borrowers.  
The Act limits microlending facilities to provide loans only to businesses that are of a certain 
size or involved in certain nascent industries. The Act also requires that qualifying microfinance 
institutions provide services beyond the mere provision of capital to their clients. Taken 
together, these provisions assure that microfinance institutions will take steps to lower the 
overall risk of default on loans backed with state funds and lend only to enterprises that are 
unlikely to have access to other sources. The Act does not, however, require that enterprises 
provide proof of a lack of access to traditional funding. A provision requiring proof of denial 
from a traditional bank may help further limit access to funding to those enterprises truly in 
need. 
 
(ii) Nebraska Microenterprise Development Act 
Nebraska’s  Microenterprise  Development  Act, enacted in 1997 and repealed in 2011,6 defined a 
microfinance  institution  as  “any  community-based or nonprofit program which has developed a 
viable plan for providing training, access to financing, and technical assistance for 
microenterprises  and  which  meets  the  criteria  and  qualifications  for  LB  327.”7 Factors taken 
into account in the determination of whether an institution qualifies for funding include:8  
                                                     
3 Mont. Code Ann. § 17-6-403(4) (West 2012). 
4 Mont. Code Ann. § 17-6-403(7) (West 2012). 
5 Mont. Code Ann. § 17-6-408 (West 2012). 
6 In 2011, the Microenterprise Development Act was superseded by the Business Innovation Act, which kept many 
of the provisions of the former program intact.  
7 Neb. Legis. Legis. Research Div., A Review: Ninety-Fifth Legislature First Session, 1997, at 14. 
8 Id. 
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 the  institution’s  plan  for  providing  business  development  services  and  microloans  to  
microenterprises, 
 the scope of services provided by the institution,  
 the plan for coordinating services and loans by the institution with commercial lending 
institutions,  
 geographic representation of all regions of Nebraska (rural, urban, and neighborhoods),  
 the ability of the institution to provide for business development in areas of chronic 
economic distress and low-income regions of the state,  
 the ability of the institution to provide business training and technical assistance to 
microenterprise clients,  
 the ability of the institution to monitor and provide oversight of microloan recipients, 
and  
 the sources and sufficiency of operating funds for the institution. 
The  Act  also  defined  “microenterprise”  and  “microloan.”  Microenterprise  was  defined  as  “[a]ny  
business  with  five  or  fewer  employees.”  Microloan  was  defined  as  “[a]ny  business  loan  up  to  
$35,000.”9 
 
The Act attempted to limit funding only to these microfinance institutions that targeted 
microenterprises truly in need. At the same time, however, the $35,000 maximum microloan 
may be somewhat limiting for certain businesses. Even small entrepreneurs often need over 
$35,000 and more than five employees to get a business up and running. If the concern is risk of 
loan loss, this could be somewhat mitigated by putting in place specific programming to be 
offered to microenterprises to reduce risk of default. Additionally, the amount of state funds to 
which a microfinance institution has access could be made to vary based on their percentage of 
funds repaid, number of loans current, or portfolio default rate. 
 
(iii) Virginia Enterprise Initiative 
The  Virginia  Enterprise  Initiative  (“VEI”)  uses  a  “hub  and  spokes”  model  for  the  distribution  of  
state funds to Microenterprise Development Organizations  (“MDO”).  An  MDO  is  defined  as  a  
“[l]ocal  organization  that  delivers micro-enterprise services. Services offered may include 
business skills training, business plan development training, one-on-one technical assistance, 
micro-loans and post-loan  assistance.”10 A microenterprise is defined as a business with five or 
fewer employees that requires $35,000 or less in capital.11 The VEI provides funding to MDOs at 
both the regional and local levels. MDOs called Regional  Service  Providers  (“RSP”)  are  
responsible  for  identifying  Local  Service  Providers  (“LSP”),  which  provide  funding directly to 
microenterprises within their region. The amount of funding a given RSP receives is based on a 
                                                     
9 Neb. Dep’t. of Econ. Dev., Report to the Legislature on the Nebraska Microenterprise Development Act (2007), available at 
http://www.neded.org/files/businessdevelopment/microenterprise/06MicroEntAnnRep.pdf.   
10 See Va. Enter. Initiative, 2011 VEI Program Design (2012), available at 
http://www.dhcd.virginia.gov/CommunityDevelopmentRevitalization/PDFs/VEI_Program_Design.pdf. 
11 Id. 
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“performance  pay”  model  that  evaluates  their  past  performance.  Performance  incentives  may  
be based on number of qualified business plans, jobs created, and loans made.12  
 
The “hub  and  spokes”  model has both advantages and disadvantages. RSPs are more likely to 
be familiar with the needs and opportunities within their region than a state agency would be, 
and the performance pay model gives them an incentive to channel funding to only the best 
LSP programs.13 Likewise, LSPs have an incentive to be innovative and well managed in order to 
be chosen for funding by the RSP in their region. A downside, however, may be the potentially 
higher administrative costs of having two intermediaries between the state funding and the 
microenterprise that will ultimately put the funding to use.   
 
The VEI does not include a requirement that microenterprises seeking funding be unable to 
secure traditional loans. Such a provision would be useful in ensuring that only businesses with 
no other source of funding have access to state funding. In addition, and similar to the 
Nebraska program described above, the requirements in the VEI that a microenterprise have 
five or fewer employees or require $35,000 or less in capital are very restrictive and may 
exclude many potential businesses. 
 
Recommendations Regarding Eligibility Criteria 
 
To prevent non-microfinance institutions, such as traditional banks or high-interest payday 
lenders, from taking advantage of lending facilities meant for microlenders, access must be 
strictly limited. Accordingly, we recommend limiting access to state funding to  only  “qualified 
microfinance  institutions.”  Qualified  microfinance  institutions  should be certified by the 
Arkansas Department of Commerce. Factors determining whether a microfinance institution is 
to receive certification should include: 
 
 Non-profit status (i.e. funding should be limited to non-profit organizations) 
 Demonstrated record of success in microlending or, alternatively, a thorough evaluation 
of  a  proposed  microlender’s  business  plan 
 Focus on target populations (e.g. minority communities, rural areas, urban poor, 
disadvantaged populations, etc.) 
 
In  addition,  we  recommend  that  “microenterprise”  be  defined  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  state’s  
goals of financing microenterprises are advanced. Factors taken into account in defining 
microenterprise businesses eligible to take advantage of state-supported lending should 
include: 
 
 Number of employees 
 Annual revenue 
                                                     
12 Id. 
13 Id.  
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 Inability to access traditional credit, determined by proof that they have been denied a 
loan by at least one traditional lending institution. 
  
V. FURTHER POLICY PROVISIONS 
 
In addition to eligibility criteria for microlenders and microloan recipients, a state funding 
program should also consider other provisions designed to promote sustainability and effective 
use of funds. Several such provisions are discussed below.  
 
Limits on the Dollar Amount of Loans Provided to Microenterprises 
An obvious complement to restricting the size of microenterprise customers of microlenders is 
a restriction on the dollar amount of loans that can be provided to any one microenterprise. 
This restriction has several possible benefits: serving as a second screen to limit participation by 
businesses that have access to traditional lending or businesses that are not true 
microenterprises, forcing diversification of microlender loan portfolios, and allocating benefits 
across a wider constituency. Most states with intermediated lending programs have opted to 
impose limits on the amount a microlender may lend to any one microenterprise. Those limits 
range from $100,000 in Montana14 to $10,000 in the former Nebraska program.15 Other 
examples include a proposed Illinois program ($35,000),16 a Virginia program ($50,000),17 and a 
Washington program ($50,000).18 Washington’s  program also provides for a $500 minimum 
floor for loans to businesses,19 perhaps in an effort to avoid financing consumption or to 
promote investment in business expansion.  
 
One concern is that loan amount limits might induce microenterprises to seek loans from more 
than one microlender. It is not clear if any other state has addressed the possibility of such 
“double-dipping”  or  even whether such behavior is undesirable. Though double-dipping might 
allow businesses to circumvent the dollar amount limits, spreading the default risk among 
several microlenders might have benefits for the businesses while serving the same purposes as 
traditional loan syndication, providing other positive outcomes for the program goals.  
 
Restrictions on the Use of Funds by Microenterprises 
In addition to specifying maximum dollar amounts available, some states have opted to impose 
restrictions on how microenterprises may use the proceeds of loans from microlenders. 
Louisiana’s  microenterprise  program  is  a  strong example. There, the relevant state agency has 
determined that loan recipients may not use the proceeds of state-backed loans for any of the 
                                                     
14 Mont. Code Ann. § 17-6-407(6)(b) (West 2012). 
15 See Neb. Legis. Legis. Research Div., supra note 7, at 15. 
16 H.B. 5420 25(e), 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2009). 
17 See 2011 VEI Program Design, supra note 10, at 2. 
18 See State of Wash. Joint Legis. Audit & Review Comm., Microenterprise Development Program Meets Statutory Objectives but 
Department of Commerce Oversight is Inadequate (2012).  
19 Id. 
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following business purposes: starting a restaurant, bar, or consumer finance business; 
renovation expenses; refinancing debt; or purchasing another business.20 It is beyond the scope 
of this brief to examine which particular business purposes, if any, should be removed from 
eligibility, and, as in Louisiana, that question might best be resolved by the General Assembly or 
administering state agency.  
 
Relending Requirements for Microlenders 
Another common feature of state microlending programs is a requirement that each 
microlender relend a specified percentage of its capital. Montana, for instance, requires that its 
intermediaries lend at least 60% of state funds to small businesses within two years of 
accepting such funds.21 As another example, Nebraska requires microlenders to disburse at 
least 50% of state funds as microloans.22  
 
These restrictions are clearly meant to ensure that state funds reach their ultimate target, 
microenterprises, but there might be some risk that, if calibrated too strictly, a relending 
percentage requirement would push a microlender to accept higher-risk applicants than it 
would otherwise. This concern might be compounded by loan size limits that force lenders to 
spread their funds across a wider number of businesses. Thus, consideration of a relending 
requirement highlights the fundamental tension between maximizing access to capital and 
ensuring the sustainability of microlending.  
 
A similar but distinct requirement would cap the amount of state funding that a microlender 
could use for administrative or overhead costs. This type of cost-based restriction could either 
replace a relending percentage requirement or, as in Nebraska, serve as a complement to such 
a restriction.23 An administrative cost cap might be preferable to a relending requirement in 
that it might not force microlenders to drop credit standards to meet a percentage goal, but 
there may be countervailing problems with clearly defining administrative costs.  
 
Matching Requirements for Microlenders 
A matching provision would require each microlender to raise a certain amount of non-state 
funding for every dollar received from the state program. This type of provision has the obvious 
goal of increasing the ultimate impact of each state dollar. To that end, most states in our 
survey utilize some sort of matching requirement. The required ratio, though, varies 
considerably across states. At one extreme is a bill introduced but never passed in Illinois, which 
would have required a microlender to raise only 15% of the amount it lent from non-state 
                                                     
20 La. Admin. Code tit. 1, § 7503 (2012). 
21 Mont. Admin. R. 8.99.504(6) (2012).  
22 See Neb. Legis. Legis. Research Div., supra note 7, at 15. 
23 The Nebraska legislation mandates that microlenders spend no more than 10% of their funds for administrative purposes. Id. 
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sources, that is, an 85:15 state to non-state ratio.24 At the other extreme are programs that 
require 1:1 state to non-state matching.25  
 
Montana provides an interesting case study on matching requirements. While the state only 
requires $1 of private funds for every $6 of state funds received, it seems that the more 
successful microlenders in the state raised far more than the required amount of private 
funding.26 In Nebraska as well, successful microlenders raised far more in private funds than 
they received from the state program; nine microlenders were able to raise roughly $2.4 million 
in outside funds after receiving about one-tenth that amount from the state.27 These 
experiences suggest that substantial private matching is necessary for successful microlending, 
though the authors of this brief expect that microlenders currently operating in Arkansas 
already exceed any matching requirements. Moreover, the success of private matching 
demonstrates  that  states  can  achieve  significant  “bang  for  their  buck”  by  leveraging  private  
fundraising. At the same time, matching requirements pose a barrier to entry for new 
microlending operations, but that barrier might serve as a desirable method for screening out 
unsustainable programs. 
 
If the ideal matching requirement is unclear, Arkansas might consider incentivizing private 
fundraising rather than setting an obligatory ratio (see infra). 
 
Performance Incentives and Reporting Requirements for Microlenders 
Beyond the types of provisions discussed above, several state programs provide performance 
incentives for microlenders. Both the cost loans to microlenders (in terms of interest rates) of 
and the amount of state funding available to a lender can serve as appropriate incentives. It is 
useful to note an analytical distinction between the two broad frameworks for incentive 
schemes.  
 
A first framework for incentives is tied to the ultimate outcomes of lending, like jobs created by 
microenterprise borrowers. In the eyes of the state, the economic outcomes of lending are 
what ultimately matter, and thus these criteria have the advantage of being more directly tied 
to the program’s  objectives.  However,  because the data on outcomes would generally be one 
step removed from the microlender, the information may be harder to verify and potentially 
less accurate. Causality might also present a problem; for example, a microlender with 
theoretically better processes might simply be operating in a tougher local economy where job 
creation is more difficult.  
 
                                                     
24 H.B. 5420 25(b), 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2009). 
25 Nebraska formerly had such a requirement, see Neb. Legis. Legis. Research Div., supra note 7, at 15, but has now moved to a 
requirement that microlenders match  only  35%  of  state  funds,  Neb.  Dep’t  of  Econ.  Dev.,  2011 Business and Innovation Act 
Application Guidelines Microenterprise Lending Program 3 (2011). 
26 For  example,  the  Montana  Community  Development  Corporation,  one  of  the  state’s  qualified  microlenders, made over $5 
million in loans despite receiving only $1.6 million from the state. Mont. Cmty. Dev. Corp., 2011 Annual Report 13 (2011), 
available at http://www.mtcdc.org/images/stories/documents/montanacdc_annualreport_web.pdf.  
27 Neb. Enter. Fund, Annual Report January 2012, at 8. 
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In the second framework, incentives are tied to particular microlender behavior or processes, 
like raising private funds to match state funds. Process-based criteria have the advantage of 
being more directly observable; the microlender should have clear data on the actions it has 
taken. However, process targets are useful only insofar as they are good proxies for ultimate 
outcomes, and it might not be clear if a certain practice (or set of practices) is truly optimal.  
 
Possible criteria drawn from state and federal programs are listed below: 
 
1. Outcome-based criteria 
 Loan repayment/delinquency rates  
 Impact of lending in terms of job creation28 or job retention 
 Impact of lending in terms of microenterprise business plans created29 
 Focus on disadvantaged areas (measured perhaps by percentage of loans made in 
economically distressed areas)30 
 Extent  of  a  microlender’s  geographic  coverage31 
 Increase in microenterprise gross revenue over a period of time 
 Amount of microloan spent by microenterprise in local areas or on local goods 
2. Process-based criteria 
 Average loan size (incentivizing smaller loans)32 
 Innovation in lending techniques or credit products33 
 Amount or percentage of non-state funds used 
 Amount or quality of technical training or management assistance provided to 
businesses34 
 Low administrative costs or reductions in administrative costs of microlenders35 
Some of these criteria likely target the same objectives through different means and thus may 
be duplicative. For example, average loan size might serve as a proxy for both portfolio 
diversification and for lending to communities that have little access to traditional banking. 
However, there is not necessarily a major downside to redundancy. 
 
                                                     
28 See 2011 VEI Program Design, supra note 10, at 7. 
29 Id. 
30 Used by the proposed Illinois Microloan Program Act. H.B. 5420 30(c). ), 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2009). 
31 Virginia Enterprise Initiative, supra note 28. 
32 Used by the proposed Illinois Microloan Program Act. H.B. 5420 10(3)(A), 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2009). 
33 Virginia Enterprise Initiative, supra note 28. 
34 The Illinois Microloan Program Act would have created a parallel funding mechanism for marketing, management, and 
technical assistance to small business. H.B. 5420 10(3)(B), 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2009). 
35 Though it does not provide direct incentives for administrative cost reductions, the Virginia Enterprise Initiative provides 
fixed-amount grants up to $20,000 to provide staffing capacity. 2011 VEI Program Design, supra note 10, at 25. This hard limit 
might be viewed as an indirect incentive to keep administrative costs (or at least staffing costs) low.  
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Whatever criteria are used, an incentive program would entail reporting requirements to be 
promulgated by the Department of Commerce or other relevant state agency. While an 
incentive-based system might be preferable to a requirement-based system for several reasons, 
the former would likely create more monitoring costs for the state agency, which would need 
to develop and periodically update formulae for allocating the pool of state funds. 
 
Recommendations Regarding Further Policy Provisions 
It is beyond the scope of this brief to provide detailed recommendations, but we believe that a 
few high-level conclusions might serve an Arkansas program well. First, given the ubiquity of 
the practice, limits on the dollar amounts loaned to individual microenterprises are probably 
beneficial. That said, the ideal limit might be difficult to determine ex ante, and so we 
recommend delegating such a decision to the Department of Commerce or another relevant 
state agency. Second, a  “hard”  requirement  to  relend  a  certain  percentage  of  state  funds 
certainly has the appeal of ensuring state money finds its target, but an initial requirement 
would likely need to give new microlenders an extended period of time to meet that goal. 
Third, a matching requirement is clearly necessary for sustainability, though it should probably 
be set below a 1:1 ratio to avoid deterring entry. If microlenders see a need to exceed the 
matching ration, there is no barrier to doing so.  
 
Finally, the General Assembly should direct the Department of Commerce or another relevant 
state agency to devise an incentive scheme from some or all of the criteria listed above. This 
scheme would help the state allocate its funds in an efficient manner and, if inclusive of enough 
criteria, would still allow microlenders the flexibility of experimenting with different business 
models. Arkansas might wish to concentrate on one or a few potential criteria, but if it adopts a 
significant number, the state might  do  best  to  implement  something  like  the  “point  system”  
used  by  USDA’s  Rural  Business  Enterprise  Grants,  in  which  participants  are  awarded  a  variable  
number of points based on each of a wide variety of factors.36  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The overriding concern of program design in this context is the extension of state aid to 
promote entrepreneurship and inclusive growth. At the same time, the state must ensure that 
its money is being used appropriately. Through adequate eligibility criteria, lending restrictions, 
and incentives for microlenders, we believe that the state can achieve both goals 
simultaneously. 
  
                                                     
36 See 7 C.F.R. § 1942.305. 
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DISCLAIMER 
 
Law students working under faculty supervision prepared this report.  The report 
is not intended to serve as legal advice and you should not rely on it alone to 
make decisions.  You should consult with an attorney, certified public accountant, 
and/or insurance representative certified in any applicable states before taking 
any action in reliance on the legal analysis in this memorandum. 
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APPENDIX A – CHART OF POLICY OPTIONS 
OVERVIEW OF POLICY OPTIONS 
Major Areas for 
Regulation 
Primary Options Secondary Options 
1. Definitions/ 
Eligibility Criteria 
A. Microlenders 
Non-profit 
status 
Demonstrated record or, 
alternatively, 
viable business plan 
Focus on 
target 
populations 
B. Microenterprise 
# of employees Yearly revenue Access to 
capital 
Start-up costs 
2. Terms of Loans to 
Microenterprise 
A. Limits on $ amounts to 
businesses 
    
B. Restricted business lines 
or use of funds (e.g. not 
for refinancing) 
    
3. “Hard”  Lender  
Conduct Criteria 
(Mandatory) 
A. Relending percentage 
    
B. Matching of state funds 
    
4. “Soft”  Lender  
Conduct Criteria 
(Incentives) 
A. Outcome-based criteria 
Repayment/ 
delinquency 
rates 
Jobs created  Business plans 
created  
% of lending in 
disadvantaged 
areas 
B. Process-based criteria 
Average loan 
size 
% non-state 
funds used 
Amount of 
technical 
assistance 
provided 
Low 
administrative 
costs 
